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Abstract
This study provides new evidence on the impact of activist hedge funds in influencing target
companies’ operational performances, especially distinguishing four different types of activism
demands: 1) changing corporate governance, 2) restructuring balance sheet, 3) implementing
growth strategies, and 4) cutting cost and divesting non-core assets. While a general improvement
in operating performances is observed across activist-targeted public companies, I find that the
group four hedge funds tend to have greater positive impacts as measured by operating metrics
such as return on assets (ROA) and gross profit margin (GPM). The research addresses
understudied areas of shareholder activism and identifies the subtle differences among different
types of activist hedge funds. This analysis aims to provide passive investors a better forecast of
the impact of the identified activist investor type.
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Introduction
Shareholder Activism
Shareholder activism is an alternative investment strategy wherein shareholders with more than 5%
of equity in a business seek to influence the firm’s growth strategy, capital allocation plan, and
organizational structure by engaging with the board of directors. While activism investing is less
common compared to the other passive investment alternatives in the public market, such as
traditional long/short and index investing, it is critical to the whole investing community due to its
high profiles. Activism has evolved significantly since the idea was formalized by Benjamin
Graham in 1927 when he pressured the board of directors at Northern Pipeline to return excess
cash to its shareholders through a published letter to the board of directors. Graham,
after being turned down by the board, launched a proxy fight to seek support from other
shareholders. This campaign was the start of more interventions from hedge fund
managers advocating for changes directly related to public companies’ daily operations.

Despite the increasing significance of activism investing to the financial market, the strategy is
understudied as past studies have failed to identify the subtler differences across various types of
activist hedge funds. That is, the studies categorize activism campaigns too loosely without
factoring in the obvious distinctions across hedge funds and portfolio managers. In addition, the
metrics used to evaluate the impacts of activism campaigns are usually too simple to capture the
whole picture. While activism is intended to improve companies’ long-term operational
efficiencies and asset utilization rates, immediate stock price is frequently used to evaluate the
effectiveness of activist campaigns. Gompers et al. (2001) have constructed a “Governance Index”
to measure the level of shareholder rights, but it also failed to account for the multi-dimensional

impacts of activists on corporate governance. The misalignment between activists’ goals and
measurement of the results creates unsatisfied needs for a more systematic framework to evaluate
the performances of different activism strategies.

This research defines an activism campaign as the filing of an initial SEC Schedule 13D, in which
the activist clearly professes its goal to influence managements’ strategies in the “purpose”
statement of the filing. Furthermore, this research only includes campaigns wherein the
pronounced goal is to improve financial performance, instead of addressing non-financial issues
such as gender diversity and racial equality.

Literature Review
The principle-agent problem at publicly listed companies arises from the separation of ownership
and governance. Managers are usually incentivized to grow beyond the optimal size of their
firms in order to maximize the resources under their control (Jensen 1986). Empirical research has
shown that the most significant reason for adopting growth-driven strategies is the compensation
structure that rewards management for absolute profit growth rather than improvements in return
on invested capital (Kaiser and Young 2015). The potential threat of a lower return on investment
gives rise to the emergence and popularity of shareholder activism as an alternative strategy to the
traditional passive investing of long/short equity. By acquiring a block stake of over 5% in a public
company, an activist investor aligns their interests with the other passive shareholders of the
company. The significant equity ownership compensates the activist investor with an equity
upside for their monitoring cost of due diligence work and public campaigns, and it also enables
the activist to pose a credible threat to the board of directors.

Scholars have made prior attempts to investigate the effectiveness of activist investors’
involvement in improving target companies’ performance (April, Klein, and Zur 2009). However,
the performance improvements were mostly measured using the target companies’ share price at a
short period of time after the activists filed for a schedule 13D, thus resulting in a mismatch
between the measurement and activist investors’ pronounced goals and investment horizon.

Empirical studies of activist hedge funds that also hold positions in passive investments have
concluded that firms targeted by hedge funds for active purposes outperform those selected as
passive investment targets; in particular, these activist positions outperform by 1.75% in excess
return surrounding the 13D/G filing date (Clifford 2008). The same research also highlighted an
increase in value creation at the activist target firms, in the form of operating efficiency (ROA)
improvement for as much as 1.22% (Clifford 2008).

While the previous literature on activist campaigns finds that activism campaigns are associated
with positive value creation and stock performance improvements, little is known about the
relative performance of activism campaigns launched for different purposes, such as pushing for
majority vote standard and requesting share repurchases. In addition, divergence in styles and
public demands among activist hedge funds is also understudied. With shareholder activism
gaining popularity and a larger dataset of activism campaigns becoming available, this research
intends to investigate the effectiveness of different public demands and activist styles to identify
distinctions among activist investors.

Methodology
Sample Construction
This research focuses on activist hedge funds who explicitly pronounced their intention to
influence management in the SEC-required 13D filings when they passed the 5% ownership
threshold. Specifically, activist hedge funds accumulating fewer than 5% of a company’s equity
shares are not included in the sample even if they have communicated their intentions with the
management. The screening criteria ensures that the study only includes the activism transactions
filed with SEC and reduces the noise that could be potentially introduced by sampling from
unverified sources. I collect a dataset of activist campaigns from Activist Insight, which extracts
data from SEC.gov, and take disclosed investments in U.S. companies from 2010 – 2019. Since
the share price of small-sized companies tend to fluctuate significantly with idiosyncratic events
that are not captured by the control samples, including the nano-cap and micro-cap companies will
reduce the credibility of the result. Therefore, the sample excludes the nano-cap and micro-cap
companies with a market capitalization of less than $200 million as of their corresponding 13D
filings’ date.

The sample size is further reduced by filtering the activist type. Activist Insight classifies activist
hedge funds into five different categories based on their focus types: 1) primary focus funds which
dedicate most (or all) of its assets to activist positions; 2) partial focus funds which often employ
activist tactics yet also uses other investment strategies; 3) occasional focus funds which adopt an
activist stance on an infrequent basis; 4) engagement focus funds which are typically large
institutions and individuals that rally for change to promote good corporate governance; and 5)

concerned shareholders who collectively attempt to enforce change, typically in a “one-off”
situation. Because this research is interested in examining the activist hedge funds with dedicated
resource to conduct pre-investment due diligence and post-investment monitoring, I only include
campaigns launched by primary focus funds and partial focus funds as my data points.

When submitting a 13D filing, activist hedge funds usually announce more than one demands
ranging from improving corporate governance to pursuing a merger and acquisition transaction.
Activist Insight creates separate entries for different demands of a transaction, and the demands are
classified into one of the 37 types. Because most, if not all, confrontational activist hedges funds
require board seats as a tactic to pressure the board of directors and to better deliver the real
operation-related demands, I remove data points where “gain board representation” or “change
board composition” is specified as the activist’s demand. Since there are usually multiple demands
for hedge fund investors demanding board representation, the campaigns are still represented in
the overall dataset with their operation-related demands. Table 1A in Appendix summarizes the
remaining 35 demand types and their corresponding demand code from 1 – 4 for later use. The
control group I use is the target company’s industry-composite portfolio of publicly traded
companies according to its corresponding Fama-French 48 industry code.

After choosing the universe of activist target companies, I collect their financial ratios at firm level
provided by Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) through Wharton Research Data
Services (WRDS). The ratios are retrieved monthly by querying the companies’ most recent
quarterly (10-Q) or annual (10-K) reports, and therefore the ratios are updated every quarter. The

merged dataframe with my companies of interest, their corresponding Fama-French 48 industry
code, and their relevant financial ratios is subsequently joined with a dataframe with financial
ratios at industry level on industry code. Finally, I get a table of activist campaigns with
information on their activist investors, the target companies’ financial ratios, and the control
group’s financial ratios on the same dates.

Experimental Design
The choice in experimental design to compare the operational performances of active and passive
investment targets is similar to the approach found in (Clifford 2008). However, the research
design of comparing performances of different demand types and tracing back to the hedge funds
is largely unique to the literature. Prior literatures have reached contradictory conclusions on
activist hedge funds’ influences on the target companies’ operational performances, and the
difference can be attributed to multiple factors including different control groups used, different
time horizon of sample selection, and different target companies identified. As a niche strategy in
the alternative investing world, shareholder activism has very few data points compared to the
traditional long/short equity investing. Therefore, this research anticipates to analyze broader
trends and to base my result interpretations on both statistical outputs and empirical evidence from
prior literature and case studies.

The research uses archival data to investigate if activist hedge funds add value to the target
companies as measured by operating and leverage ratios including return on assets (ROA), debt
over earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), and operating
margin after depreciation (OPMAD). Specifically, I intend to explore if the stated demand types
in 13D filings are correlated with the changes in target companies’ operating and leverage ratios.
I define the 13D filing date, as reported on Activist Insight as demand date, as “day 0.” I set the
event window to begin on day -30 to best capture a target company’s performance before activist
hedge fund’s engagement. Since public companies are requested to publish their earnings on a
quarterly basis, a 30-days window reasonably captures the companies’ financial profile before
activists’ involvement. I extend the event window to day +365 to give it enough time for the activist

hedge fund to engage with the board of directors, implement intended changes, and observe results,
either successful or unsuccessful, reflected in the company’s financial report. I set the window to
one year (or four quarters) after the initial demand date for multiple reasons: 1) to account for
seasonality of businesses, 2) to avoid an overly long event window that may allow more
unmeasured confounding variables to complicate the result interpretation, and 3) to account for
the fact that operational changes are not reflected immediately in the financial statements. There
are certain caveats associated with the event window decision, and I will analyze them further in
the discussion section. Paired sample t-test is used to assess the statistical significance of the
differences between the test group and the control group.

Results
While previous literature on shareholder activism has found statistical evidence on abnormal
market returns around the filing of a block acquisition by the activist hedge funds, scholars have
reached contrasting conclusions on improvements in operating performance. April, Klein, and Zur
(2009) find no evidence that activist targets become more profitable as measured by multiple
operating metrics, and that there can be deterioration in performance relative to that of the control
group in the year after 13D filings. However, Clifford (2008) concludes the opposite, finding 4.30%
of excess mean ROA improvement and 1.56% of excess median ROA improvement.

Table 3 reports that activist targets tend to experience a mild increase in operating performance in
the 1-year period following the 13D filing. Across the four demand types, activist campaigns with
a focus on cost cutting or asset sale (type 4) report more consistent and statistically significant

improvement as measured by return on assets (ROA), return on common equity (ROCE), and gross
profit margin (GPM). I examine ROA, research & development expenses / Sale (RD_Sale), and
debt / earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization (Debt / EBITDA) in further
details.

a. ROA
As pointed out by Bethel et al, firms targeted by activist investors tend to experience larger asset
divestitures without significant impacts on their operating cash flows. This results in an
improvement in asset utilization efficiency, which translates directly into an increase in ROA. The
results from this research sample are largely consistent with the conclusions of Bethel et al, and I
find that the activist hedge funds whose demands focus on cost-cutting or asset divestiture (group
four) observe a significant increase in their portfolio companies’ ROA more frequently. A more
striking ROA improvement is present among target companies in group one, whose activist
investors advocate for changes in corporate governance. However, upon closely examining the
transactions belong to this group, I find it difficult to attribute the increase in operational
improvement to activism because the requests are usually accompanied by other non-governance
related demands. A review of the data points categorized as governance-related demands shows
that activist hedge funds tend to use the demands as a tactic to win a channel of communication
with the board of directors, and it is relatively uncommon for the activists to achieve their stated
governance-related demands such as “replacing management” or “amending bylaw.”

The result also implies that target companies that are demanded to reorganize balance sheet (group
two) and focus on growth strategies (group three) experience a milder improvement in ROA
compared to the ones demanded to pursue strategies focusing on cost cutting or asset sale (group
four). The finding is in line with our hypothesis, and it justifies the better excess market returns of
activist-targeted companies. As pointed out by Karpoff (2001) and Clifford (2008), activist
investors tend to target poorly performing firms. The results offer indirect evidence that activist
hedge funds are better at capturing the opportunities to operationally restructure underperforming
areas of business than to pursue growth or financial engineering initiatives.

b. R&D / Sale
Bushee (1998) finds generally that a large proportion of ownership by institutions that have high
portfolio turnover significantly increases the probability that managers reduce R&D to reverse an
earnings decline. Specifically, he believes that management is incentivized to cut R&D
expenditures to meet quarterly earnings expectations. I find just the opposite for group one, two
and four. In particular, I conclude that companies demanded to cut cost and pursue asset divestiture
(group four) experience an expansion in R&D / Sale of 0.25x relative to the control group.

While companies targeted by activist hedge funds are under the spotlight and have more media
coverage, it is shown that the management are not cutting discretionary R&D expenditures as a
percentage of sale, and this is especially true for the cost-cutting focused (group four) target
companies. Combined with our findings on ROA, the result suggests that the group four companies
are able to reallocate their capital to R&D investments without a decline in capital efficiency.

c. Debt / EBITDA
The result shows that companies demanded to focus on cost cutting or asset divestiture experience
an insignificant decrease in leverage. However, a significant increase in leverage utilization is
observed among companies demanded to reorganize their balance sheet, which indicates that the
type two activist hedge funds are successful at achieving their stated target. The type two hedge
funds take, on average, 3.48x more turns in leverage compared to before activists’ investment.

Discussion
While the results confirm my hypothesis that target companies demanded to cut cost or pursue
asset divestures by activist hedge funds tend to experience the largest improvement in value
creation measured by ROA, I also acknowledge some caveats to the research design and the
derived conclusions.

First, the control group selection can have an impact on the result. As confirmed by April et al.
(2009) and Clifford’s (2008) competing statements on the influence of activist hedge funds, the
distinction between activist and passive hedge funds as well as the selection of comparable
companies as the control group can potentially reverse the conclusion. There are multiple
unobserved confounding variables that influence operating performance and return on invested
capital in addition to activists’ engagement with a portfolio company, and the fact that return on
invested capital is volatile makes it more difficult to make reasonable derivations. If I can collect

more data of activist campaigns across a larger time span, I expect to improve the confidence level
of the analysis.

Furthermore, it takes time for activist hedge funds to achieve their desired goals and the changes
may require a longer period to get reflected on the companies’ financial statements. For example,
the impact of growth initiatives will be compounded further into the future, and my choice of a
one-year period as my event window captures only a partial effect of activist investors. However,
the decision is a tradeoff for fewer confounding variables that could be inexplainable if a longer
event window is applied.

Lastly, my segmentation of activist campaigns and hedge funds is a categorization contingent on
the hedge funds’ self-reported demands. While I believe this is the most reasonable basis for
grouping, it is questionable to what extent I can rely on the demands proposed in 13D filings. In
many cases, board of directors and managers of the targeted companies communicate with the
hedge fund investors in private to exchange opinions. Although documents on the conversations
can provide better insights on the real and complete demands put forward by activist hedge funds,
it is impossible to access those without companies’ voluntary disclosure.

Conclusion
The motivation for this research is to uncover a deeper understanding of the different types of
common demands by activist hedge funds, and the impacts of their actions on the change in

operating performances of the target companies. Upon examining 1238 activist campaigns from
2008 – 2020, I find that activist hedge funds that focus on cost-cutting and asset divestiture
initiatives (group four) observe greatest improvements in their portfolio companies’ operating
performances.

In particular, the group four companies are able to improve their profitability without cutting
discretionary investments in research and developments. In addition, I do not find statistically
significant decline in leverage utilization due to asset divestiture. This is consistent with my
hypothesis that companies invested by activist hedge funds tend to have excess improvements in
operating performances, and the hedge funds that focus on cost cutting and asset divestiture tend
to have greatest positive impacts on their target companies.

Appendix
Table 1A – Demand Type and The Corresponding Category Number
Demand Type
Adopt Majority Vote Standard
Amend Bylaw
Board Independence
Business Focus
Business Restructuring
Lack of/Inaccurate Information From Company
Redemption/Amendment of Poison Pill
REIT / MLP Conversion
Removal of CEO or Other Board Member
Remuneration
Replace Management
Separate Chairman & CEO
Terminate Investment Advisory Agreement
Use Universal Ballot
Dividends
Equity Issuance
Excess Cash
Oppose Equity Issuance
Push For/Oppose Merging of Shares
Recapitalization
Restructure Debt
Return Cash to Shareholders
Share Repurchase
Under Leverage
Oppose Sale of Company
Focus on Growth Strategies
Push For Acquisition of Third Party
Closure of Business Unit
General Cost Cutting
Operational Efficiency
Oppose Acquisition of Third Party
Push for Company Division
Push for Sale of Company
Sell/Retain Assets
Spin-Off/Sale of Business Division

Category
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Table 1B – Category Number and The Corresponding Demand Category
Change corporate governance

1

Reorganize balance sheet

2

Implement growth strategy

3

Cost cutting / asset sale

4

Table 2A – Summary Campaign Characteristics (Number of Campaigns by Demand Year)
Demand Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

# of Campaigns
24
36
89
154
156
188
124
144
137
185

Table 2B – Summary Campaign Characteristics (Hedge Funds by Year Founded)
Year Activist Founded
1934
1954
1971
1975
1976
1977
1978
1982
1983
1986
1987
1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

# of Hedge Funds
17
2
3
15
34
89
1
2
4
4
48
24
1
38
10
11
11
32
26
61
10
3
56
46
11
59
24
77
13
23
15
63
78
125
71
85
9
9
8
16
4

Table 2C – Summary Campaign Characteristics (Top 15 Hedge Funds by Number of
Campaigns)
Activist Hedge Fund
Starboard Value
Elliott Management
Engine Capital LP
Carl Icahn
JANA Partners
Barington Capital Group
Marcato Capital Management
Clinton Group
GAMCO Investors
Trian Fund Management
Sandell Asset Management
Macellum Advisors
Ancora Advisors LLC
Legion Partners Asset Management
Third Point Partners
Krupa Global Investments (formerly Arca Capital)

# of Campaigns
89
89
54
48
46
44
38
36
34
28
28
25
22
21
20
20

Table 3 – Model Output Summary
Demand 1
Mean
ROA

Mean

sd

Mean

sd

3.91

(1.2%)

1.44

17.1%

0.88

8.9%

3.14

(32.5%)

2.96

(17.7%)

1.35

(0.8%)

0.65

(16.7%)

1.18

roa.activist - roa.control

69.5%

16.5%
414

17.9%
234

25.6%
48

538

p-value

0.003

roce_diff_activist

(13.2%)

2.38

(28.0%)

1.75

(19.4%)

0.59

(41.2%)

6.61

roce_diff_control

(55.9%)

8.9

(226.0%)

17.2

(176.0%)

9.56

(159.0%)

13.9

roce.activist - roce.control

42.7%

0.228

0.254

198.0%
414

0.079

156.6%
234

117.8%
48

538

p-value

0.347

opmad_diff_activist

(17.5%)

2.27

(10.5%)

4.23

(22.6%)

0.65

(35.5%)

6.67

opmad_diff_control

(64.4%)

89.60

NaN

NaN

(291.0%)

13.50

NaN

NaN

opmad.activist - opmad.control

46.9%

0.082

0.259

NaN
414

0.079

268.4%
234

NaN
48

538

p-value

0.917

gpm_diff_activist

(11.2%)

1.61

(18.7%)

1.36

(4.2%)

0.29

(17.2%)

1.54

gpm_diff_control

(58.1%)

14.20

(50.5%)

5.34

(5.3%)

0.37

(65.1%)

9.40

gpm.activist - gpm.control

46.9%

N

RD_Sale

sd

37.0%

N

GPM

Mean

Demand 4

roa_diff_control

N

OPMAD

sd

Demand 3

roa_diff_activist

N

ROCE

Demand 2

NaN

0.183

31.8%
414

NaN

1.1%
234

47.9%
48

538

p-value

0.503

rd_sale_diff_activist

(0.04)

0.59

0.00

0.02

0.03

0.22

0.00

0.02

rd_sale_diff_control

(1.08)

18.90

(0.12)

1.78

0.37

7.62

(0.25)

4.23

rd_sale.activist - rd_sale.control

1.04

N
p-value
Debt_Ebitda debt_ebitda_diff_activist

0.378

0.877

0.12
414

0.251

0.246

(0.33)
234

0.290

0.25
48

0.757

538
0.178

0.75

6.94

3.25

14.90

1.58

5.05

0.54

8.01

debt_ebitda_diff_control

(0.37)

11.80

(0.23)

11.20

0.15

6.52

0.66

11.60

debt_ebitda.activist - debt_ebitda.control

1.11

N
p-value

3.48
414

0.093

1.43
234

0.005

(0.12)
48

0.287

538
0.849
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